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Introduction 
 
The issue of benchmarks in the context of earnings manipulation is a much investigated issue in 
accounting literature3. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) investigate earnings management 
behaviour of firms and link it to earnings benchmarks: profits and earnings increase. Using 
distribution of earnings, they postulate that discontinuities around zero earnings and zero 
changes in earnings to be evidences of managers manipulating earnings to report profits and to 
sustain last year’s earnings. Later studies of managers engaging in earnings management to meet 
or beat earnings targets have replicated this methodology of examining distribution of earnings 
with mixed results, casting doubts on validity of using distributions method to ascertain earnings 
management behaviour.  
    In addition to the mixed results shown by using the distribution of earnings, whether 
benchmark beating is caused by earnings manipulation remains an unresolved issue for at least 
two reasons. First, the assertion of causality between earnings management and benchmarks is 
based on ex post reported earnings. However, real managerial effort to meet benchmarks that 
results in improved firm performance cannot be distinguished from apparent earnings 
manipulation by examining reported earnings, especially for firms that are on the margins of 
benchmarks (Dechow, Richardson & Tuna 2003). Second, although earnings discontinuities are 
observable, the distribution of “normal earnings level” in the absence of managerial 
manipulation is not defined (Kerstein & Rai 2007). In fact, managerial discretion to beat earnings 
targets, in part at least, is conditional on the nature of true earnings, that is, pre-managed 
earnings. For example, managers may increase earnings to reach targets when pre-managed 
earnings are below benchmarks. Managers can also decrease earnings when pre-managed 
earnings are well above benchmarks in order to save some income to beat benchmarks in the 
future (known as income smoothing or ‘cookie jar accounting’) or when pre-managed earnings 
are at a level so far below target that management discretion or effort is insufficient to reach it so 
that accruals are used to deflate earning (‘big bath accounting’). Besides these two reasons, 
econometric and measurement issues of what constitutes earnings manipulation also create 
problems in using the earnings discontinuities to establish evidence of earnings management per 
se. 
    In the Australian context, the issue of benchmark beating and its association with 
earnings management is also not settled. Holland and Ramsay (2003) examine earnings 
distribution at two benchmarks (zero earnings and increase or sustaining last year’s earnings) to 
find greater than expected frequency of firms around small profits and small earnings increases, 
and fewer than expected small losses and small earnings decreases to draw inferences regarding 
earnings manipulations. However, Coulton, Coulton and Taylor (2005) do not find significant 
difference between discretionary accruals for the benchmark beating and ‘just-miss’ groups. As 
such, they suggest that caution is needed to interpret benchmark beating caused by earnings 
management, especially for ‘just-miss’ groups.  
    Based on this evidence in the Australian context, and the mixed evidence of 
benchmark beating in general, we are motivated to examine the behaviour of benchmark beating 
further. We extend Holland and Ramsay (2003) and Coulton et al. (2005) by investigating 
                                                 
3 Notable studies among these are: Barua, Elliott and Finn (2006), Coulton et al. (2005), Dechow, Richardson and 
Tuna (2000), Dechow et al. (2003), Degeorge, Patell and Zeckhauser (1999), Durtschi and Easton (2005), Holland 
and Ramsay (2003), Jacob and Jorgensen, (2007), Kerstein and Rai (2007) and Plummer and Mest (2001)  
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whether managers manipulate earnings to meet or beat the same benchmarks: above-zero 
earnings (profits) and earnings increase (sustain prior year’s earnings). However, we differentiate 
our research design by conditioning our analysis and results on benchmarks of ‘pre-managed 
earnings’. We use pre-managed earnings as a measure of true earnings level of a firm and 
postulate that managers engage in earning manipulation only if the earnings are short of 
benchmark levels on an ex ante basis. Our focus on the examination of pre-managed earnings, to 
the extent that accruals are used on an ex-post basis to adjust earnings, is an ex ante condition 
under which firms seek to manipulate earnings. Our research design allows us to condition the 
earnings manipulation behaviour, either to increase or decrease earnings when pre-managed 
earnings are below or above these benchmarks.  
     In addition to shedding light on the link between earnings manipulation and 
benchmark, we refine the standard Jones model for several alternate measures of accrual 
measurement. Operating cash flows (McNichols & Wilson 1988) and relative earnings 
performances (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1995) are identified to contribute to model 
misspecification in estimating discretionary accruals. In our study, we estimate discretionary 
accruals by using a variation of the Jones model with the change of operating cash flows as an 
additional variable.  We employ the performance adjusted technique of Kasznik (1999) to adjust 
the effect of industry-wide relative earnings performance.   
Our summary of results is as follows. We first find significant discontinuities in the 
distribution of reported earnings and changes in earnings. However, these discontinuities 
disappear when the earnings are purged of discretionary accruals. We then estimate frequency of 
firms achieving earnings targets with the aid of earnings manipulation. The result suggests that a 
relatively low level of earnings management takes place among the subset of Australian firms 
confronted with reporting earnings decreases and losses compared to that of U.S. Third, we find 
when pre-managed earnings are negative or below prior year’s earnings, firms are more likely to 
exercise positive discretionary accruals to inflate earnings to beat earnings benchmarks. 
    The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section  is the literature 
review and hypothesis development; the third section  discusses research design and 
methodologies; the fourth describes data and sample selection process; the fifth presents the 
empirical results and, the sixth section concludes the paper.  
 
Prior Literature and Hypotheses 
 
In an important study of earnings manipulation, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) state two theories 
to provide rationales to avoid reporting earnings losses and decreases. Using transaction cost 
theory they suggest that firms who report losses or earnings decrease tend to face higher 
transactions costs from the firms’ stakeholders. Further, the prospect theory postulates losses and 
gains are valued differently implying that a firm may realise the largest value increase when it 
turns an expected loss to a profit. In addition, negative earnings decrease affect firms’ credit 
ratings and their cost of capital resulting in loss of firm value and imply further earnings 
decreases in future.  
   The role of benchmarks or targets is important for earnings manipulation. From an 
accounting perspective, income smoothing requires that to reduce fluctuation managers may use 
accruals to increase or decrease current reported earnings to match pre-determined earnings 
target levels. From the managerial incentive perspectives, however, earnings manipulation 
behaviour is generally based on the notion that managers are assumed to be wealth-maximisers 
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who recognise that their wealth is adversely impacted when their firms’ reported earnings fail to 
achieve benchmarks. Balsam (1998) shows evidence that CEO cash compensation is associated 
with discretionary accruals and such association varies depending on the circumstance where 
positive discretionary accruals are used to achieve earnings benchmarks. Supporting this 
conjecture Healy (1985) finds that shareholders increase their monitoring when a firm fails to 
meet their benchmarks and Gaver , Gaver and Austin (1995) find managers are punished in the 
form of reduced compensation and an increased probability of dismissal.  The compensation 
committees can also distinguish between the components of earning and reward managers when 
their discretionary behaviour achieves the firms’ goals. Ke (2001) links beating profits and last 
year’s earnings behaviour with CEOs’ compensation and pointed out that CEO compensation 
incentive formed one set of economic determinants of benchmark beating behaviour. Matsunaga 
and Park (2001) found that CEO compensation would be reduced when a firm misses an 
earnings benchmark because the compensation committee may view this as a signal of poor 
management performance. In Australian annual reports, corporate earnings figure is widely used 
as a key indicator of business performance. Earnings are one of the first measures highlighted 
and most of executive’s review will compare this year’s earnings performance with those of 
previous years. Target Based Incentive Plans are the most common incentive schemes used in 
determining CEOs’ compensation level (Holland & Ramsay 2003). These evidences strongly 
imply that accounting benchmarks matter for managerial behaviour and provide incentives to 
manipulate earnings.  
It is a necessary condition that earnings manipulation is dependent on true earnings of a 
firm. After all, earnings manipulation is not necessary when true earnings are adequate for the 
current period. Researchers have modelled this conditionality in circumstances leading to 
earnings manipulation. Fundengerg and Tirole (1995) present a theory that under the threat of 
CEO dismissal, a manager’s decision to shift earnings is based on the firm’s pre-managed 
earnings performance. They predict managerial action to shift future earnings to the current 
period as poor current pre-managed earnings could lead to a manager being dismissed. Payne 
and Robb (2000) found that when pre-managed earnings are below market expectation, 
managers will use income-increasing discretionary accruals to increase earnings toward analysts’ 
forecasts. Gao and Shrieves (2002) showed the relationship between CEO compensation 
components and earnings management is conditional on proximity of pre-managed earnings to 
an earnings benchmark, the closer the level of pre-managed earnings to earnings benchmarks, the 
more likely that managers engage in earnings management. Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000b, 
2005) found that firms with pre-managed earnings below zero or below last year’s earnings are 
more likely to report positive discretionary accruals. Daniel, Denis and Naveen (2008) reported 
that managers have the incentive to manage earnings upwards to avoid dividend cuts when 
managers anticipate that pre-managed earnings would otherwise fall short of the expected 
dividend levels. 
Techniques to meet benchmarks are not limited to discretionary accruals only. Dechow et 
al. (2000) found that working capital and positive special items, in addition to discretionary 
accruals are used as mechanisms to achieve small profits and to meet analysts’ forecasts. 
Analysts’ forecasts are also achieved through either managing sales upward or managing 
operating expense downward (Plummer & Mest 2001). Phillips et al. (2003) found that deferred 
tax expenses are associated with benchmark beating behaviour of reporting profits and earnings 
increases, whereas total accruals are associated with benchmark beating behaviour of meeting 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Using real earnings manipulations (accelerated sales recognition, 
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increasing production to reduce cost of goods sold), Roychowdhury (2006) documented that 
managers avoid reporting annual losses and negative changes in earnings. In a fundamental 
sense, however, as observed by Jones (1991), management discretions are made through 
accruals. More accruals are in place simply because the accounting system creates accruals to 
recognise revenues when they are earned and match expenses to those revenues, irrespective of 
whether cash has been received or paid. In addition, discretionary accruals are likely to be the 
prime measures for earnings management because the level of discretionary accruals is difficult 
to be monitored by outsiders (Gaver et al. 1995).  Given the scope of  this research, and based on 
prior literature, we rely on the discretionary accruals (DA) of Jones (1991) to estimate earnings 
manipulation. Nonetheless, we subject this estimation to alternate specifications and robust 
adjustments.   
In this paper, we postulate that when pre-managed earnings are below benchmarks, 
managers will inflate income to report profits and earnings increase. In our setting, the pre-
managed earnings is the condition of managerial discretion to adjust earnings from losses or 
earnings decreases to report ex post profits or earnings increases. We examine firms with 
negative pre-managed earnings (and pre-managed earning changes) and categorise them to have 
negative profits or earnings decreases prior to any earnings manipulation. Our two hypotheses (in 
alternative forms) are thus as follows: 
 
H1:  When pre-managed earnings are negative, firms are more likely to use 
discretionary accruals to report marginal profit.  
 
H2:   When the current period pre-managed earning are below previous period 
reported earning, firms are more likely to use discretionary accruals to report positive 
change in earnings.  
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Earnings Distribution 
 
In a manner similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), we construct histograms of the earnings 
and earnings changes. Earnings are measured as income before extraordinary items deflated by 
beginning total assets. The changes of earnings are measured as difference of income before 
extraordinary items between year t and year t-1 deflated by beginning total assets. Our two 
benchmarks are reported profits and earnings increases. Silverman (1986) and Scott (1992) 
suggest that the interval width of a histogram should be positively related to the variability of the 
data and negatively related to the number of observations. To determine the interval widths, we 
performed both the calculations and the visual inspection, we calculate histograms interval width 
as 2(IQR)n-1/3 , where IQR is the sample inter-quartile range and n is the number of observations. 
This returns an interval width of 0.04 for both earnings level and earnings change distributions. 4 
Although we would prefer to have a finer width, we are constrained by our sample size which is 
smaller than those of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Holland and Ramsay (2003) and Coulton et 
                                                 
4 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) use interval widths of 0.005 for scaled earnings and 0.0025 for scaled changes in 
earnings. Holland and Ramsay (2003) use 0.01 for scaled net profit after tax and 0.005 for scaled changes in net 
profit after tax. Coulton et al. (2005) use 0.01 for both earnings levels and changes in earnings. 
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al. (2005). Following our empirical calculation and visual inspection, we chose 0.04 as an 
appropriate interval width for our sample size. This interval width is also consistent with Cheng 
and Warfield (2005) who measure earnings surprises that are equal to or greater than four cents. 
 
 Figure 2-Histograms of earnings and pre-managed earnings changes 
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We then formally test whether observed discontinuities are significant. Under the null 
hypothesis with smooth earnings distribution, the standardised difference of each interval with 
respect to distribution should be equal to zero (Burgstahler & Dichev 1997). If managers 
exercise positive discretionary accruals to report profits or earnings increase, we would expect to 
see the standardised difference to be significantly negative for the interval immediately below 
zero and significantly positive for the interval immediately above zero. The z-statistic used to 
test the null is the difference between the actual and expected number of observations in an 
interval divided by the estimated standard deviation of the difference.5  
 
Discretionary Accruals 
 
We use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Peasnell et al. (2000a) 
evaluated different models in estimating discretionary accruals and suggested that the power to 
                                                 
5 The Z-statistic is defined as: Z= 
Var
nEn )( where n is actual number of observations in the interval; E(n) is 
expected number of observations in the interval, defined as the average of the number of observations in the 
intervals immediately adjacent to the interval; Var is the estimated standard deviation of the difference, calculate 
as: )1()()4/1()1( 1111   iiiiii ppppNppNVar ;
Where N is the total number of 
observations and pi is the probability that an observation will fall into interval i 
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detect earnings management seems to be higher for the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model. We 
include change in cash flows from operations as an additional explanatory variable into the Jones 
model based on evidence in McNichols and Wilson (1988) and Dechow (1994, 1995) indicating 
that change in cash flow from operations are negatively correlated with total accruals.   The 
modified Jones model used in our analysis is: 
 
    ititititititititit CFTAPPEaTAREVaTAaTATAC    41312111 )/()/()/1(/         (1) 
 
where TACit is total accruals for firm i for year t scaled by total assets for year t-1; total 
accruals are calculated as the difference between net operating income and operating cash flows. 
TAit-1 is total assets for firm i at the beginning of year t. ∆REVit is net sales for firm i for year t 
less net sales for firm i for year t-1 scaled by total assets for year t-1. PPEit is the gross property, 
plant and equipment for firm i for year t scaled by total assets for year t-1. ∆CFit is operating 
cash flows for firm i for year t less operating cash flows for firm i in year t-1 scaled by total 
assets for year t-1. α1, α2, α3,α4   denote industry year specific estimated coefficients. εit is the error 
term. 
     Researchers also argue that tests related to earnings management that do no control for 
a firm’s earnings performance are misspecified.  For example, Dechow et al. (1995) found that 
the measurement errors in estimation of discretionary accruals are negatively correlated with 
firm earnings performance. We employ Kasznik’s (1999) matched-portfolio technique to adjust 
potential measurement error that is correlated with earnings performance. First, we obtain 
discretionary accruals, i.e. the residual from cross sectionally estimating equation (1) by GICS 
industry and by year. Then, we rank discretionary accruals into percentile groups by return on 
assets in period t (ROAt), defined as operating income deflated by lagged total assets. We then 
compute the median discretionary accruals for each percentile and subtract it from each 
observation’s discretionary accruals in that percentile (see equation 2). By standardising the 
residuals in this manner we remove the possible bias that firms having higher (lower) residuals 
are likely to manage earnings at a rate higher (lower) than the median performance firm. As such 
our measure of discreationary accrual is  
 
          ptitit
DAMedianDADAAdj )()(                                                                   (2) 
 
Where DAit is raw discretionary accruals for firm i for year t obtained as residual from 
equation (1), Median(DA)pt is median value of the discretionary accruals for a portfolio p at year 
t, and p is  the percentile ranking of raw discretionary accruals based on firm’s return on assets. 
 
Pre-managed Earnings 
 
The research design used in this study involves examining the link between discretionary 
accruals and whether pre-managed earnings are below or above earnings benchmarks. By 
definition, the sum of true pre-managed earnings and discretionary accruals is equal to reported 
earnings. Following Gore et al. (2007), the pre-managed earnings are measured as earnings in 
year t minus adjusted discretionary accruals and is used to capture the true earnings levels prior 
to managerial manipulation; the pre-managed changes in earnings are measured as the difference 
between earnings in year t and year t-1 minus adjusted discretionary accruals and is used to 
capture the true earnings changes before earnings management.  
AAFBJ  |  Volume 6, no. 1, 2012 
 
36 
 
 
                         itPME = itit DAAdjE )(                                                              (3) 
                       itPME = itit DAAdjE )(                                                           (4) 
 
Where PMEit is pre-managed earnings; ∆PMEit is pre-managed earnings change; Eit is 
reported earnings, measured as income before extraordinary items deflate by the beginning total 
assets; ∆Eit is reported earnings change, measured as the difference of income before 
extraordinary items between year t and year t-1 deflated by the beginning total assets; Adj(DA)it 
is adjusted discretionary accruals obtained from equation (2); i and t denote firm and year, 
respectively.  
 
Regression Model 
 
In testing under what circumstances managers will inflate income to beat two earnings 
benchmarks, we predict when pre-managed earnings are below benchmarks, managers will 
inflate income to report profits and report earnings increase. We test whether firms with pre-
managed earnings below benchmarks will use positive discretionary accruals to beat the 
benchmarks. Accordingly, our dependent variable is the adjusted discretionary variable 
( )( itDAAdj from equation (2) above.  
 We partition our sample where pre-managed earnings (changes) are below and 
above zero.  The changes in earnings and pre-managed earnings are standardised around 0.  We 
then condition our analysis by having firms which have the reported earnings (changes) above 
zero. These firms are more likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management as their 
pre-managed earnings levels (changes) are below benchmarks but try to report ex post profits 
(earnings increases). Following Holland and Ramsay (2003) and Coulton et al. (2005), we also 
focus on small earnings intervals  of [−0.04, 0] and [0, +0.04] immediately surrounding these 
benchmarks. Firms which are expected to make small losses (earnings decreases) are more likely 
than other firms to engage in earnings manipulation. Accordingly, we create several clusters of 
firms based on these benchmarks conditioned on changes in earnings and pre-managed earnings. 
Our regression model to test earnings management behaviour takes the following form: 
 
            Adj(DA)it = α0+β1CLUSTER_Nit+β2SIZEit+β3GROWTHit+β4ROAit+β5WCit  
                                                +β6LEVit +βj Σ INDj+єit                                                              (5) 
 
    The variable of interest in this model is the indicator variable CLUSTER_Nit. The 
CLUSTER_Nit takes four constrained form as follows:  
 CLUSTER_1it = 1 if (PMEit <0 OR ∆PMEit<0), 0 otherwise;  
 CLUSTER_2it = 1 if (PMEit <0, Eit ≥0 OR ∆PMEit <0, ∆Eit ≥0), 0 otherwise; 
 CLUSTER_3it = 1 if (−0.04≤PMEit <0 OR −0.04≤∆PMEit <0), 0 otherwise; 
 CLUSTER_4it =1 if (−0.04≤PMEit <0, 0≤Eit <0.04 or −0.04≤∆PMEit <0, 0≤∆Eit <0.04), 0 
otherwise.  
 According to our hypotheses, we should see a positive association between the 
use of discretionary accruals and the firms in each of these clusters. If managers use discretion to 
inflate income in order to beat benchmarks, conditioned on the pre-managed earnings, the 
coefficients on CLUSTER_Nit are expected to be positive across all four clusters. The first cluster 
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(CLUSTER_1it ) is a partition of our sample consisting of firms that have either negative or 
decline of earnings on a pre-managed basis. CLUSTER_2it  is  a subset of CLUSTER_1it having 
firms reporting positive earnings or positive change in earnings. CLUSTER_3it and 
CLUSTER_4it  are similar to previous clusters but belong to group of firms who have narrowly 
missed out on earnings performance in terms of their pre-managed earnings. We define these 
narrowly missing firms as ‘just-miss’ firms. 
 In our cross sectional regression, we employ a vector of control variables 
recognised from previous literature to be associated with discretionary accruals. We control for 
firm size (SIZEit), measured as the logarithm of the total assets at year t, as smaller firms are 
documented to be associated with earnings management (Chan, Faff & Ramsay 2005; Holland & 
Jackson 2004; Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca 2007; Sloan 1996). The growth opportunity 
(GROWTHit), measured by the change of sales between year t and t-1 divided by total assets at 
year t. As growth firms have relatively strong incentives to meet earnings benchmarks the market 
penalises growth firms for negative earnings surprise (Barth, Elliott & Finn 1999; Beaver, 
Kettler5 & Scholes 1970; Minton & Schrand, 1999; Myers & Skinner, 2006; Skinner & Sloan, 
2002). Profitability (ROAit), measured by net operating income divided by total assets for firm i 
at year t, is included because prior studies either found lower accounting profits provide 
motivation for firms to manipulate earnings to mitigate financial constraints (Ashari et al. 1994; 
White 1970;), or earnings management firms tend to exhibit a high profitability as it affect 
managers’ job security and the compensation contract (Degeorge et al, Patell & Zueckhauser 
1999; Fudenberg & Tirole 1995; Hayn 1995). We expect that firms with greater working capital 
level (WCit), measured by the difference between current assets and current liabilities for firm i 
in year t, are more likely to manage earnings to move from below a benchmark to above the 
benchmark because short-term working capital accrual gives managers more flexibility in 
exercising discretions (Burgstahler & Dichev 1997). We control for a firm’s proximity to debt 
covenant violation (LEVit), measured by total debt to total assets for firm i in year t, and a 
positive sign is expected (Dechow et al. 2000; Press &Weintrop 1990; Watts & Zimmerman 
1978).  Finally, we control for industry effects. INDjt equals 1 if firm i is from jth GICS industry 
(Energy, Material, Metals and Mining, Industries, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, 
Health Care, Information Technology, Telecommunication and Utilities) and 0 otherwise. 
The data set used in our study is of panel structure. With panel data structure, the OLS 
assumption of independence in regression error term is generally violated by the presence of both 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Greene 2002). We use a two-way cluster-robust 
regression to correct both cross-sectional and serial correlations (Thompson 2006). The two-way 
cluster-robust procedure allows clustering along the two dimensions and generates the 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors of White (1980). 
 
Data and Sample Selection 
 
The starting point for the sample is the population of all ASX listed firms in the DataStream 
database including active file, suspended file and dead file with necessary annual accounting and 
market data from the period 1999 to 2006. The initial sample includes 3,914 firms with 31,312 
observations. This study excludes all firms in the financial sector with GICS code (4010-4040) 
since their financial statements are subject to special accounting regulations. They include 45 
banks, 194 equity investment instruments, 228 general financial, 5 life insurance, 44 nonequity 
invest instruments, 19 nonlife insurance, 276 real estates, altogether 811 firms and 6,488 
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observations. Regulated firms from the Utilities sector have not been eliminated as the number is 
relatively few in Australia. Also excluded are 1,832 firm observations whose industry codes are 
unclassified by DataStream. A further 16,910 firm observations are omitted since necessary data 
for accrual estimation is missing: this includes the loss of observations for 1999 as lagged 
variables of total assets and first differencing taken for the variables of revenue, account 
receivables, and operating cash flows are required in regressions. Firms involved in restructuring 
activities with 10 observations are excluded. The entire ASX covers very large companies from 
the Top 200 ASX index, also included are many very small listed companies. Thus, the top and 
the bottom 1 % observations by extreme values of total assets are trimmed, including 125 
observations. These sampling criteria resulted in a sample with necessary data for 5,947 firm-
year observations for accrual estimation.  
Since the estimation of the cross-sectional accrual model requires at least ten firms per 
industry-year combination, industry groups with fewer than ten observations in a given sample 
year are combined if they have   close??GICS codes. As Australian markets are dominated by 
gold and mining industries, the Metals & Mining sector is extracted from the Material sector to 
see whether this sector has an industry cluster effect on earnings management practices. Both 
Metals & Mining and Material sectors use the same code (GICS 1510). This procedure results in 
nine GICS industry groups, that is, Energy (1010), Material (1510), Metals & Mining (1510), 
Industrials (2010-2030), Consumer Discretionary (2510-2550), Consumer Staples (3010-3030), 
Health Care (3510-3520), Information Technology (4510-4530), and Telecommunication & 
Utilities (5010-5510). Each of the firm-year observations in the estimation sample is assigned 
into one of the nine combined industry groups according to the GICS code. These criteria result 
in a final sample of 4,746 firm-year observations (Table 1 Panel A).  Panel B and C of Table 1 
report the distribution of firms across industry and years in our sample. 
 
 
Table 1 
Sample description 
 
Panel A-Sample construction 
 
The sample comprises DataStream equity files including all active suspended and dead equity firms from year 2000 
to year 2006 
 
Criteria Firm-year 
  
Initial firm-years with accounting data: 35,226 
  
Less: Financial firms                                                        (7,299) 
         Industries are not classified                                    (2,061) 
         Missing data (21,007) 
         Extreme data (trimmed at 5% and 95% levels) (110) 
  
Final sample 4,746 
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Panel B- Final Sample by Industry 
 
GICS      Industry Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1010 Energy 299 6.31 299 6.31 
1510 Material 339 7.13 638 13.44 
1510 Metals & Mining 1454 30.64 2092 44.08 
2010-2030 Industrials 263 5.56 2355 49.64 
2510-2550 Consumer 
Discretionary 
783 16.48 3138 66.12 
3010-3030 Consumer Staples 391 8.24 3529 74.36 
3510-3520 Health Care 477 10.07 4006 84.43 
4510-4530 Information 
Technology 
618 13.02 4624 97.45 
5010-5510 Telecommunication 
& Utilities 
122 2.56 4746 100.00 
 
Panel C-Final Sample by Year 
 
Year Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
2000 184 3.88 184 3.88 
2001 265 5.56 449 9.44 
2002 502 10.58 951 20.02 
2003 442 9.32 1393 29.34 
2004 959 20.20 2352 49.55 
2005 1163 24.50 3515 74.05 
2006 1231 25.95 4746 100.00 
 
Panel D-Summary statistics 
 
Variables Mean Median S.D. Min 25% 75% Max 
        
E -0.1242 -0.0291 0.3020 -1.6713 -0.2517 0.0644 0.5340 
ΔE 0.0396 0.0033 0.6166 -2.8276 -0.0806 0.0649 17.9975
PME -0.1261 -0.0409 0.3189 -1.8191 -0.2693 0.0761 0.6650 
ΔPME 0.0378 -0.0011 0.6169 -2.8641 -0.1096 0.1028 17.8976 
DA -0.0271 -0.0037 0.1320 -0.4024 -0.0828 0.0655 0.3369 
Adj (DA) 0.0019 -0.0000 0.0867 -0.1897 -0.0563 0.0574 0.2141 
SIZE 10.5250 10.1603 2.0809 5.8972 8.9939 11.8425 16.0523 
GROWTH 0.7311 0.0854 5.5019 -1.0000 -0.0970 0.3262 168.1289 
ROA -0.0841 -0.0361 0.2814 -3.4855 -0.1908 0.0781 1.3880 
WC 0.2370 0.1475 0.5487 -9.3901 0.0238 0.3532 10.6387 
LEV 0.1683 0.0812 0.3089 0.0000 0.0000 0.2666 9.0425 
Variable definitions: 
 
E = Reported earnings level, measured as income before extraordinary items deflate by the beginning total assets 
ΔE = Reported earnings change, measured as  the difference of income before extraordinary items between year t and year t-1 
deflate by the beginning total assets 
PME = Pre-managed earnings level, calculated as reported earnings minus adjusted discretionary accruals  
ΔPME = Pre-managed earnings change, calculated as reported earnings change minus adjusted discretionary accruals 
DA = Raw discretionary accruals, estimated from the cash flow Jones model  
Adj (DA) = Adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated as raw discretionary accruals adjust for extreme earnings performance 
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SIZE   = Firm size, measured by the logarithm of the total assets 
GROWTH = Growth opportunity,  measured by the change of sales between year t and t-1  divided by the beginning total assets 
ROA = Profitability, measured by net operating income divided by total assets  
WC = Working capital, measured by the difference between current assets and current liabilities 
LEV = Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets 
 
Basic descriptive statistics (Table 2) show  that mean (median) reported earnings (E) and 
earnings change (ΔE) are −0.1242 (−0.0291) and 0.0396 (0.0033), respectively. The mean 
(median) of pre-managed earnings (PME) and their changes (ΔPME) are −0.1261 (−0.0409). 
Mean of (median) raw discretionary accruals is −0.0271 (−0.0037).  
 
 
 
Table 2 
Frequency distribution of reported earnings and pre-managed earnings 
 
Panel A-Reported earnings level and change 
       
Intervals 
            ___________E_______ _______∆E_______ 
 Obs, Freq. (%) Obs – Exp.   z-stat Obs, Freq.  (%) Obs – Exp.     z-stat 
−0.20 0.038 0.003 0.89 0.027 0.001 0.18 
−0.16 0.039 −0.006 −1.72 0.03 −0.006 −2.00 
−0.12 0.051 0.005 1.31 0.045 −0.001 −0.14 
−0.08 0.053 −0.001 −0.25 0.061 −0.014 −3.39 
−0.04 0.057 −0.013 −2.89*** 0.105 −0.032  −6.15***
0 0.086 −0.008 −1.61 0.213 0.093 13.60***
0.04 0.131 0.070 5.52*** 0.135 0.001 0.08 
0.08 0.112 0.019 3.53 0.056 −0.031 −7.06 
0.12 0.055 −0.017 −4.07 0.039 −0.002 −0.43 
0.16 0.032 −0.008 −2.48 0.025 −0.005 −1.74 
0.20 0.024 0.002 0.75 0.021 0.002 0.58 
 
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings level and change 
      
Intervals 
__PME____ _____∆PME____ 
 Obs, Freq. (%) Obs – Exp.      z-stat Obs, Freq.  (%) Obs – Exp.        z-stat 
−0.20 0.037 −0.002 −0.60 0.053 0.026 1.93 
−0.16 0.043 0.003 0.85 0.039 −0.017 −1.33 
−0.12 0.044 −0.007 −1.94 0.058 0.002 0.11 
−0.08 0.058 0.005 1.24 0.074 −0.001 −0.06 
−0.04 0.063 −0.008 −1.88 0.092 0.021 1.19 
0 0.083 0.006 1.26 0.068 −0.019 −1.19 
0.04 0.092 0.010 1.90 0.082 0.019 1.13 
0.08 0.081 0.004 0.83 0.058 −0.021 −1.41 
0.12 0.063 −0.002 −0.46 0.076 0.024 1.45 
0.16 0.049 0.003 0.77 0.047 −0.008 −0.58 
0.20 0.029 −0.006 −1.92 0.034 0.004 0.34 
Notes:  
1).Earnings (changes) are deflated total assets as of the beginning of the annual period. The expected frequency is computed as the mean of the 
frequency in the two adjacent intervals. For the sake of the brevity, only intervals with earnings (changes) scaled by total assets ranging from −0.2 
to 0.2 are presented in the table. The intervals are of width 0.04 of total asset. The frequencies are expressed as percentage of the total sample.  
2). *** marks the significance levels are at 1% or better for the test of the intervals immediately below or above benchmarks.  
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Results 
 
Do Firms Beat Benchmarks? 
  
Figure 1, Panel A is a histogram of reported earnings levels with an interval width of 0.04 and a 
range of -1 to +1. This histogram shows the appearance of a single-peaked, bell-shaped 
distribution with discontinuities surrounding the standardised zero earnings benchmark. 
According to our standardised distribution, the expected frequency for firms who are in the 
interval of [-0.04, 0] is the average of the two adjacent intervals and is 0.70%.  However, the 
observed frequency of reported earnings, E, is 0.57% for firms who are in this interval. This 
difference in observed frequency being less than the expected frequency by 0.13% (“obs-exp” 
column) is borne out by our Z-test statistic of -2.89 which is significant at one-percent level.   
The firms reporting earnings between the interval of [-0.04, 0] are just-miss firms and 
their frequency under a normal distribution should not differ significantly for the rest of the 
distribution. This discontinuity in distribution suggests that some firms in this group may have 
boosted their earnings to go over the zero-benchmark to report positive earnings. Turning our 
attention to the group of firms which lie just above the zero-benchmark, we find their observed 
frequency is more than the expected frequency by 0.07% (0.131% versus 0.061%) and 
significantly so through our z-test statistic of 5.52 at one-percent level. If managers resort to 
earnings manipulation to report small profits, earnings discontinuity should be observed at the 
interval [0, +0.04], as is the case. The number of firms in the earnings interval of [0, +0.04] 
being in excess of the expected frequency bolsters the suggestion that there may be manipulation 
of earnings surrounding the zero-benchmark.   
This discontinuity is also apparent when we consider the change in reported earnings 
(ΔE). The observed frequency of firms reporting just below the standardised earning of no-
change benchmark, in the interval [-0.04, 0], is below the expected frequency by 0.032%. This 
difference is also highly significant through the z-test statistic of -6.15.  Further evidence of 
possible earnings manipulation can be seen by observing the frequency difference for the group 
of firms at zero-change earnings benchmark. If the purpose of earnings management is to sustain 
last year’s earning, then the discontinuity would also occur just at the zero interval when the 
change in earnings is considered as a benchmark. The observed frequency of firms reporting 
zero-change in earnings is significantly higher (z-stat=13.60)) than the expected frequency of 
0.118%.    
Next we generate a histogram for pre-managed earnings which are purged of the effect of 
discretionary accruals.  Figure 1 Panel B displays the distribution of pre-managed earning levels 
that appears to be relatively smooth around zero. The smoothness is confirmed through the Z-
statistics of standardised difference of frequencies immediately below and above zero-PME 
intervals and found to be insignificant (-1.88 and 1.90 respectively). Given that our adjusted 
discretionary accruals are a proxy of earnings management, the removal of adjusted discretionary 
accruals confirms the evidence of earnings manipulation.  That is, in the absence of a 
discretionary component of accruals, the earnings of firms revert to their expected distribution.  
A similar result of no discontinuity is observed when we consider the distribution of change in 
pre-managed earnings. Our result from the distribution of pre-managed earnings, in levels and in 
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changes, is consistent with the prediction that the removal of adjusted discretionary accruals 
results in the disappearance of the discontinuity6.  
 
Figure 1 
Distributions of earnings and pre-managed earnings 
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Do Firms Shift Earnings When Pre-managed Earnings are Below (or above) Benchmarks? 
 
Table 3 shows the levels and changes of earnings surrounding our benchmarks, conditioned on 
pre-managed earnings. Panel A reports proportions of observations when the sample is divided 
according to reported earnings, Eit, being above or below zero, conditional on the pre-managed 
earnings being above or below zero. The overall proportion of firms with underlying earnings 
being less than zero is 57.71% (N=2739). However, when we portioned them according to actual 
reported earnings we found that 8.11% (N=385) have reported positive profits. In order to 
examine the possibility that this shift in reported earnings is due to earnings management, we 
check the differences in proportions for the overall group of firms that reported positive earnings 
against the proportion that has the PMEit >0. The portion of observations with the PMEit being 
more than zero is 42.29% (N=2007). Under the assumption that there is no attempt to manage 
earnings to report an ex-post profit, we should expect the frequency of our sample that reported 
profits, Eit ≥ 0, to be close to 42.29%. However, we find that the frequency of reported profits is 
                                                 
6 Holland and Ramsay (2003) use interval width of 0.01 in the range -0.25 to +0.24, and their test statistics are -
2.83 for the interval immediately below zero and 3.85 for the interval immediately above zero. This result is also 
consistent with Coulton et al. (2005) who use 0.01 interval width for in a range of -0.24 to +0.24.  
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45.36% (N=2153). Following Kanji (1993), we apply the z-test for correlated change in the 
frequency before and after a given intervention and find the two frequencies are statistically 
different (z-statistic=5.87, p-value=0.001). This evidence suggests that discretionary accruals 
have the effect of significantly increasing the frequency of positive earnings levels. 
Discretionary accruals also significantly increase the frequency of firms reporting small 
profits. Table 3 Panel A also shows frequencies of firms within small intervals of earnings, 
[−0.04, 0] and [0, +0.04], conditioned on similar intervals of pre-managed earnings. The 
frequency of firms reporting small earnings profits while their underlying pre-managed earnings 
is ‘just-miss’ is 11.82% (N=561).  However, the overall proportion of firms with pre-managed 
earnings being positive is only 8.83% (N=419). This is a difference of 2.99 per cent of total 
sample with 142 observations and statistically different from zero using the Kanji z-test with a z 
value of 3.81. This evidence suggests that for some just-miss firms, discretionary accruals were 
used to report a just-above profit. We also find that within this subsample, 2.44 per cent (N=116) 
shift from pre-managed small earnings losses (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0) to report small earnings profits 
(0 ≤ Eit < +0.04) with significance level being less than one per cent (not reported in the table)
7.  
Table 3, Panel B reports the impact of discretionary accruals on changes in reported 
earnings conditioned by the changes in pre-managed earnings. In our sample, the overall 
frequency of firms reporting increases in earnings is 52.19% (N=2477). At the same time, the 
proportion of firms reporting earnings increase while the pre-managed earnings change is also 
positive is 49.68% (N=2358). This difference in proportion is statistically different with a z-test 
statistic of 3.81. Moreover, 11.61 per cent (N=551) shift from a negative pre-managed earnings 
change (∆PMEit < 0) to report positive earnings change (∆Eit ≥ 0).  This finding is consistent 
with the argument that managers inflate earnings through discretionary accruals to transform 
previous year’s lower earnings to report earnings that are higher than or at least equal to previous 
year’s level.  
In the small intervals of [−0.04, 0] and [0, +0.04], discretionary accruals also significantly 
increase the frequency of firms reporting small positive earnings change. Panel B Table 3 shows 
the frequency of firms reporting earnings change surrounding the zero-benchmark increases from 
11.23 per cent (N=533) of the sub-sample when pre-managed earnings change is also positive, to 
13.49 per cent when the overall group of just-above firms in the whole sample is considered 
(N=640). This is a shift of 2.26 per cent (N=123) and statistically significant at below one 
percent level with z-stat of 2.688. Further, 3.88 per cent (N=184) shift from small pre-managed 
earnings decrease (−0.04 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0) to report small earnings increase (0 ≤ ∆Eit < 0.04), with 
the shift in proportion being significant (z-statistic= 2.68, p-value=0.01).  Taken all. together, the 
results in Table 3 provides evidence that some firms use discretionary accruals to transform 
earnings in their levels and changes to report positive ex-post profits and earnings increases, shift 
small losses and earnings decreases into a zero or above profit and a small earnings increases 
while the underlying pre-managed earnings levels and changes may not be positive. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Burgastahler and Dichev (1997) reported that 30−40% of U.S firms exercise discretion to report profits when pre-
managed earnings are slightly negative. Comparatively, our results suggest a lower frequency of earnings 
management in Australia among the firms confronted with reporting earnings losses. 
8 Burgastahler and Dichev (1997) reported that in the U.S 8 to 12% of firms with small pre-managed earnings 
decreases exercise discretion to report earnings increase. Our result of 2.26 per cent is lower than that of 
Burgastahler and Dichev. 
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Table 3 
Frequencies of observations shifting from pre-managed earnings (changes) below benchmarks to above 
benchmarks 
 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level 
 Eit < 0 Eit ≥ 0 Total z-stat
d 
Firm-years with  
PMEit < 0
 2354 
49.60%
385 
8.11%
2739 
57.71% 
 
Firm-years with 
PMEit ≥ 0
 
239 
5.04% 
1768 
37.25% 
2007 
42.29% 
5.87 
 
Total  2593 
54.64% 
2153 
45.36% 
4746 
100% 
 
 
     
 -0.04≤Eit<0 0≤Eit<0.04   
Firm-years with  
-0.04≤PMEit<0
 
60 
1.26% 
116 
2.44% 
361a 
7.61% 
 
 
Firm-years with 
0≤PMEit<0.04
 57 
1.20% 
119 
2.51% 
419b 
8.83% 
4.49 
 
Total 270c
5.68% 
621d
13.08% 
4746 
100% 
 
 
 
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change 
 ΔEit<0 ΔEit≥0 Total z-stat 
Firm-years with  
ΔPMEit <0
 1837 
38.71% 
551 
11.61% 
2388 
50.32% 
 
 
Firm-years with 
ΔPMEit ≥0
 432 
9.10% 
1926 
40.58% 
2358 
49.68% 
 
3.81 
Total  2269 
47.81% 
2477 
52.19% 
4746 
100% 
 
 
     
 -0.04≤ΔEit <0 0≤ΔEit<0.04   
Firm-years with  
-0.04≤ΔPMEit <0
 147 
3.10% 
184 
3.88% 
527a 
11.10% 
 
 
Firm-years with 
0≤ΔPMEit<0.04
 136 
2.87% 
202 
4.26% 
533b 
11.23% 
 
2.68 
Total 498c 
10.49% 
640d
13.49% 
4746 
100% 
 
 
 
a. the total number of observations of which pre-managed earnings (change) belong to the interval [−0.04, 0];  
b. the total number of observations of which pre-managed earnings (change) belong to the interval [0, 0.04];  
c. the total number of observations of which reported earnings (change) belong to the interval [−0.04, 0];  d. the total number of observations of 
which reported earnings (change) belong to the interval [0, 0.04] 
d.. The Z statistics are computed from Kanji (1993)  for correlated proportions and their shifts .  
 
 
Z = Z score test for the significant change in the correlated frequency before and after a given intervention 
b = the number of observations shifts from pre-managed earnings losses  to the reported earnings profits 
c = the number of observations shifts from pre-managed earnings profits to the reported earnings losses 
N = the total number of observations 
e. Significance levels are two-tailed against the standardized normal distribution.  
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Do Firms have Higher Value of Discretionary Accruals when Pre-managed Earnings are Below 
Benchmarks? 
 
We now turn our attention to the degrees of earnings management when the pre-managed 
earnings are below benchmarks. Our focus in this section is to see if the usage of discretionary 
accruals is limited only to firms who report ‘small-profits’.  Amongst all firms, firms most likely 
to manage earnings are likely to be those which are just-miss firms on the pre-managed earnings 
basis and may use the earnings manipulation methods to push the reported earnings above the 
benchmarks.   
Table 4 presents the frequencies of adjusted discretionary accruals conditioned on pre-
managed earnings. Panel A shows that, of all the firms which have positive discretionary 
accruals, roughly two thirds of firms (62.91%, N=1723) have underlying losses on a pre-
managed basis (PMEi t< 0).  If discretionary accruals (positive and negative) are to be randomly 
distributed amongst all firms, we would expect to see their distribution evenly split between 
firms which are making losses and profits on a pre-managed basis.  This evidence suggests those 
firms with a  pre-managed loss have a lot more usage of the positive discretionary accruals and 
thereby inflating earnings than those making pre-managed profits. A similar comparison for 
firms in small intervals surrounding the zero-benchmark (−0.04≤PMEit<0) shows that 58.72 per 
cent (N=212) of pre-managed small-loss making firms have positive discretionary accruals while 
the corresponding frequency for small-profit making firms (0≤PMEit<+0.04) is 45.34 per cent. In 
Panel B, when we condition the discretionary accruals with corresponding changes in pre-
managed earnings 69.14 per cent (N=1651) of firms with negative changes in pre-managed 
earnings have positive discretionary accruals as compared to only 30.58 per cent (N=721) when 
the underlying pre-managed earning changes are positive (∆PMEit ≥ 0). In the smaller intervals, 
there are 57.31 per cent of firms (N=302) with pre-managed earnings slightly below last year’s 
earnings (−0.04≤∆PMEit<0) that have positive discretionary accruals, whereas 33.21 per cent of 
firms (N=177) with pre-managed earnings slightly above last year’s earnings (0≤∆PMEit<0.04) 
show positive discretionary accruals. This evidence in table 4 suggest that firms are likely to 
have much more usage of positive discretionary accruals when faced with negative changes in 
underlying earnigns, possibly to manipulate and report earnings higher than last year’s earnings.  
This pattern is especially prominent for those firms which can be characterised as just-miss 
firms. 
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Table 4  
Frequencies of positive adjusted discretionary accruals when pre-managed earnings (changes) below 
benchmarks 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level 
 Adj(DA)it < 0 Adj(DA)it ≥ 0 Total 
Firm-years with  
PMEit < 0
 
1016 
37.09% 
1723 
62.91% 
2739 
100% 
Firm-years with 
PMEit ≥ 0
 1358 
67.66% 
649 
32.34% 
2007 
100% 
Total 2374 2372 4746 
   
Firm-years with  
-0.04≤PMEit<0
 
113 
31.309% 
212 
58.72% 
361 
100% 
Firm-years with 
0≤PMEit<0.04
 137 
32.69% 
190 
45.34% 
419 
100% 
Total 250 402 780 
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change 
 Adj(DA)it < 0 Adj(DA)it ≥ 0 Total 
Firm-years with  
∆PMEit < 0
 737 
30.86% 
1651 
69.14% 
2388 
100% 
Firm-years with 
∆PMEit ≥ 0
 1637 
69.42% 
721 
30.58% 
2358 
100% 
Total 2374 2372 4746 
    
Firm-years with  
-0.04≤ΔPMEit <0
 172 
32.64% 
302 
57.31% 
527 
100% 
Firm-years with 
0≤ΔPMEit<0.04
 279 
52.34% 
177 
33.21% 
533 
100% 
Total 451 479 1060 
   Note: This table evaluates whether firms with pre-managed earnings (changes) below benchmarks more likely to exercise positive 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings upwards. PME is pre-managed earnings level, calculated as reported earnings minus adjusted 
discretionary accruals; ΔPME is pre-managed earnings change, calculated as reported earnings change minus adjusted discretionary accruals; Adj 
(DA) is adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated from Jones (1991) version cash flows model adjust for extreme earnings performance 
 
Table 5 reports the mean and median levels of discretionary accruals conditioned on pre-
managed earnings. Panel A reports that firms with pre-managed earnings below zero have 
significantly positive mean and median discretionary accruals of 0.0273 and 0.0311 
resepectively while firms with pre-managed earnings of above zero exhibit significantly negative 
mean  and median discretionary accruals of −0.0329  and −0.0292.  Two sample t-test for the 
mean show that discretionary accruals are significantly different between the two sub samples of 
pre-managed earnings partitioned at zero. This result supports our earlier result in table 4 that 
firms with negative pre-managed earnings have higher usage of positive discretionary accruals. 
Within the small interval of [−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0] discretionary accruals of firms with pre-
managed earnings loss there is significantly positive mean and median, 0.0154 and 0.0260, 
respectively. Further, the mean and median discretionary accruals of firms within the interval of  
[0 ≤ PMEit < 0.04] are statistically not different from zero.  For the firms whose pre-managed 
earnings are already positive, though small, are already meeting benchmarks and hence do not 
have incentive to manipulate earnings.  
Panel B of Table 5 shows a similar pattern of Adj(DA)it to that of Panel A when pre-
managed earnings change is considered. Firms with negative pre-managed earnings change have 
higher positive discretionary accruals than those with positive pre-managed earnings change. The 
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mean (median) discretionary accruals for firms with worsening pre-managed earnings (∆PMEit < 
0) is 0.0336 (0.0349) and significantly positive. However, when we consider firms with 
improving pre-managed earnings (∆PMEit > 0), the mean (median) discretionary accruals is 
significantly negative −0.0303 (−0.0334). Within the small interval of pre-managed earnings 
change (−0.04 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0), the mean (median) discretionary accruals of firms within is also 
positive 0.0099 (0.0129) and significantly different from zero. Conversely the mean (median) 
discretionary accruals of firms within the small interval of  positive change in pre-managed 
earnings (0 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0.04) is significantly negative at −0.0073 (−0.0090). Two sample t- tests 
show that discretionary accruals are significantly different between two sub samples of pre-
managed earnings that are below and above last year’s earnings.  
 
Table 5 
Adjusted discretionary accruals comparing firms with pre-managed earnings are below to above 
benchmarks 
 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level 
  
PME < 0
  
__________________________ 
 
PME ≥ 0
 
       _______________________ 
 
Test for difference 
    
____________________ 
     N       Mean   Median  N Mean Median t-test p-value 
 
Adj(DA) 
 
2739 
   
   
0.0273*** 
 
 
0.0311
*** 
 
 
2007 
  
−0.0329*** 
 
 
−0.0292*** 
          
25.96 
 
 <.0001 
 
  
−0.04 ≤ PME < 0
 
    
____________________________ 
 
0 ≤ PME < 0.04
 
       
_____________________________ 
 
Test for difference 
    
______________________ 
     N       Mean   Median  N Mean Median t-test p-value 
 
Adj(DA) 
 
361 
   
0.0154*** 
 
 
0.0260*** 
 
419 
 
0.0010 
 
 
0.0073 
 
2.98 
 
0.0029 
 
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change  
  
∆PME < 0
 
    _________________________ 
 
∆PME ≥ 0
 
       __________________________ 
 
Test for difference   
___________________ 
     N       Mean   Median  N Mean Median t-test p-
value 
 
Adj(DA) 
 
     
2388 
 
     
0.0336*** 
 
   
0.0349*** 
       
       
2358 
      
        
−0.0303*** 
     
     
−0.0334*** 
          
          27.36 
            
<.0001 
 
 
  
−0.04 ≤ ∆PME < 0
 
    _________________________ 
 
0 ≤ ∆PME < 0.04
 
       ____________________________ 
 
Test for difference 
    __________________ 
     N       Mean  Median  N Mean Median           t-test p-value 
 
        
Adj(DA) 
 
      
527 
 
    
0.0099*** 
 
 
0.0129*** 
 
      
533 
 
       
−0.0073*** 
 
 
−0.0090*** 
 
         4.84 
 
<.0001 
 
Note:  
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1).This table evaluates whether discretionary accruals are different between pre-managed earnings loss (decline) firms and pre-managed earnings 
profit (increase) firms. We compare two intervals: (1) pre-managed earnings loss (decline) versus pre-managed earnings profit (increase); and (2) 
small pre-managed earnings loss (decline) versus small pre-managed earnings profit (increase). PME is pre-managed earnings level, calculated as 
reported earnings minus adjusted discretionary accruals; ΔPME is pre-managed earnings change, calculated as reported earnings change minus 
adjusted discretionary accruals; Adj (DA) is adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated from Jones (1991) version cash flows model adjust for 
extreme earnings performance. 2). T-statistics are based on t-test for the difference in means across samples and p-values are two-tailed. 
 
These results support our prediction that firms manage earnings upward when the firm’s 
pre-managed earnings performance under-shoots the benchmark. Our results are consistent with 
Peasnell et al. (2000a, 2005) who find evidence of ‘cookie-jar’ accounting and that earnings 
management to beat benchmarks is associated with board composition of non-executive and 
outside board members. Our evidence supports the ‘cookie jar accounting’ theory of managers 
decreasing earnings when pre-managed earnings are well above benchmarks in order to save 
some income to beat benchmarks in the future. This is also consistent with Degeorge et al. 
(1999) who documented that managers systematically manipulate reported earnings downwards 
when pre-managed earnings exceed threshold earnings by a substantial amount.  
 
Discretionary Accruals and Pre-managed Earnings Benchmarks 
     
In this section, we test whether discretionary accruals associated with pre-managed earnings fall 
short of particular benchmarks. We use equation (5) to test for benchmarks after controlling for 
firm size, growth rate, profitability, working capital, leverage, and industry effects discussed 
earlier.9 Since our focus is on the association between benchmarks and discretionary accruals, we 
do not discuss estimates of controlling factors but are note them in tables. 
Regression models 1 and 2 of Table 6 Panel A present regression results of Adj(DAit) of 
firms with underlying losses. The positive and significant coefficient estimate on CLUSTER_1 in 
model 1 is consistent with the hypothesis that managers make use of positive discretionary 
accruals when pre-managed earnings are negative. In model 2, we restrict our sample to firms 
reporting ex-post profits (Eit ≥ 0) while the underlying earnings are negative. The coefficient on 
CLUSTER_2 is significantly positive, indicating that for these profit reporting firms, managers 
tend to use positive discretionary accruals when pre-managed earnings are negative. It should be 
also noted that the coefficient estimate on CLUSTER_2 is stronger than CLUSTER_1 (0.0819 
versus 0.1126). This larger estimate on CLUSTER_2 provides some evidence that the earnings 
management activity is likely to be concentrated in firms that have reported positive profits 
among the loss-making firms. Model 3 and 4 are regressions based on small intervals 
surrounding zero. Both coefficients on CLUSTER_3 and CLUSTER_4 are significant positive, 
which is consistent with the view that when firms have pre-managed earnings slightly below 
zero, managers use positive discretionary accruals to inflate reported earnings to report small 
profits. Again, the larger coefficient estimate on CLUSTER_4 (0.0403 versus 0.0268) signifies 
our conjecture that small-loss firms have stronger incentive to use discretionary accruals to push 
into positive profit territory. Expectedly the predictive ability of our model, signified by R2 
estimates of regressions, increases as testing intervals move from bigger to smaller and more 
specific regions surrounding benchmark. Nevertheless these results validate our hypotheses that 
firms use discretionary accruals to beat benchamarks. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 For the sake of brevity, the control variables results are not discussed.  
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Table 6 
Two-way cluster-robust regression of adjusted discretionary accruals on pre-managed earnings are below 
benchmarks and control variables 
 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level 
Independent Variables Expected sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept ? -0.0450 
(-3.45)*** 
-0.0381 
(-2.44)** 
-0.0052 
(-0.35) 
-0.0295 
(-3.03)*** 
CLUSTER_1 ( PMEit <0) + 0.0819 
(25.87)*** 
   
CLUSTER_2 (PMEit < 0, Eit ≥ 0) +  0.1126 
(29.39)*** 
  
CLUSTER_3 (−0.04≤PMEit<0) +   0.0268 
(8.41)*** 
 
CLUSTER_4 (−0.04≤ PMEit <0,  
0≤ Eit <0.04) 
+    0.0403 
(19.29)*** 
SIZE − -0.0012 
(-1.61) 
-0.0019 
(-2.28)** 
-0.0015 
(-1.50) 
0.0015 
(2.32)** 
GROWTH + 0.0000 
(0.84) 
0.0000 
(0.84) 
-0.0003 
(-1.45) 
0.0002 
(0.18) 
ROA ? 0.0856 
(14.10)*** 
0.0917 
(8.82)*** 
0.4518 
(25.67)*** 
0.0459 
(3.03)*** 
WC + 0.0123 
(3.46)*** 
0.0149 
(2.37)** 
0.0272 
(4.38)*** 
0.0140 
(2.18)** 
LEV ? 0.0159 
(3.66)*** 
0.0425 
(4.48)*** 
0.0007 
(0.07) 
-0.0021 
(-0.29) 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  2739 385 361 116 
Adj. R2  0.2005 0.3521 0.5610 0.6437 
 
Adj(D
A)
  = Adjusted discretionary accruals scaled by total asset at year t-1, estimated  from equation (2) 
CLUST
ER           
            
             
= An indicator variable equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) is less than zero and zero otherwise. We test four regions for each of 
earnings benchmarks, where 1) PMEit (∆PMEit ) < 0; 2) PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; Eit (∆Eit ) ≥ 0; 3) −0.04≤ PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; and 4) −0.04≤ 
PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; 0 ≤ Eit< 0.04. Pre-managed earnings level (PME) are defined as reported earnings (E) minus adjusted discretionary 
accruals; pre-managed earnings change (ΔPME), calculated as reported earnings change (ΔE) minus adjusted discretionary accruals (see 
Equation 3,4) 
SIZE   = Firm size for firm i for year t, measured by the logarithm of the total assets at year t; 
GROW
T 
= Growth opportunity for firm i for year t,  measured by the change of sales between year t and t-1  divided by total assets at year t 
ROA = Profitability, measured by net operating income divided by total assets for firm i at year t 
WC = Working capital, measured by the difference between current assets and current liabilities for firm i in year t 
LEV = Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets for firm i in year t 
∑j INDj
 
= 1 if firm i is from industry j, based on GICS industrial codes and 0 otherwise 
   
2). P-values are given in parentheses below the coefficient, one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.  
3). the estimated coefficients and t statistics are two-way cluster-robust adjusted with White (1980) method.  
 
 
Table 7 shows regression tests of Adj(DAit) of firms which have pre-managed earnings 
below last year’s earnings. We find positive and significant coefficient estimate on CLUSTER_1. 
In model 2, we restrict our sample to reported earnings above last year’s earnings (∆Eit ≥ 0) and 
find that the coefficient on CLUSTER_2 is not only significantly positive but also higher than the 
model 1 estimate. This means managers tend to use positive discretionary accruals to report 
income increase to give appearance of sustaining previous year’s earnings even when pre-
managed earnings fall short of the prior year’s level. In Model 3 and 4, we consider the intervals 
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[-0.04, 0] and [0, +0.04] surrounding zero. Both the coefficients on CLUSTER_3 and 
CLUSTER_4 are significantly positive, which is consistent with the hypothesis that when pre-
managed earnings are slightly below last year’s earnings, managers use income increasing 
discretionary accruals to inflate earnings to report small but positive earnings increase.  From 
Model 1 to Model 4, we find a consistent and positive association between discretionary accruals 
when pre-managed earnings are below targets. This suggests that managers shift earnings from 
losses or earnings decreases on a pre-managed basis to report ex post profits or earnings 
increases. 
 
Table 7  
Pre-managed earnings change 
 
Independent Variables Expected sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      
Intercept ? 0.0071 
(0.55) 
0.0697 
(3.66)*** 
-0.0105 
(-0.58) 
-0.0056 
(-0.50) 
CLUSTER_1 ( ∆PMEit <0) + 0.0612 
(23.20)*** 
   
CLUSTER_2 (∆PMEit < 0, 
∆Eit ≥ 0) 
+  0.1004 
(26.06)*** 
  
CLUSTER_3 
(−0.04≤∆PMEit<0) 
+   0.0189 
(5.36)*** 
 
CLUSTER_4 (−0.04≤ ∆PMEit 
<0,  0≤ ∆Eit <0.04) 
+    0.0354 
(21.09)*** 
SIZE − -0.0052 
(-7.05)*** 
-0.0074 
(-8.13)*** 
-0.0036 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.0010 
(-2.05)** 
GROWTH + 0.0000 
(1.04) 
0.0000 
(1.36) 
0.0002 
(2.82)** 
0.0002 
(0.51) 
ROA ? 0.0402 
(7.03)*** 
0.0002 
(0.03) 
0.0877 
(7.9)*** 
0.0243 
(2.68)*** 
WC + 0.0039 
(1.09) 
0.0131 
(2.41)** 
-0.0029 
(-0.44) 
-0.0130 
(-2.42)** 
LEV ? 0.0167 
(3.78)*** 
0.0408 
(4.86)*** 
0.0023 
(0.20) 
-0.0008 
(-0.13) 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  2388 551 527 184 
Adj. R2  0.1749  0.2997 0.1078 0.5845
Notes: 
1). Variable definitions: 
Adj(D
A)
  = Adjusted discretionary accruals scaled by total asset at year t-1, estimated  from equation (2) 
CLUST
ER           
            
             
= An indicator variable equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) is less than zero and zero otherwise. We test four regions for each of 
earnings benchmarks, where 1) PMEit (∆PMEit ) < 0; 2) PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; Eit (∆Eit ) ≥ 0; 3) −0.04≤ PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; and 4) −0.04≤ 
PMEit (∆PMEit) < 0; 0 ≤ Eit< 0.04. Pre-managed earnings level (PME) are defined as reported earnings (E) minus adjusted discretionary 
accruals; pre-managed earnings change (ΔPME), calculated as reported earnings change (ΔE) minus adjusted discretionary accruals (see 
Equation 3,4) 
SIZE   = Firm size for firm i for year t, measured by the logarithm of the total assets at year t; 
GROW
T 
= Growth opportunity for firm i for year t,  measured by the change of sales between year t and t-1  divided by total assets at year t 
ROA = Profitability, measured by net operating income divided by total assets for firm i at year t 
WC = Working capital, measured by the difference between current assets and current liabilities for firm i in year t 
LEV = Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets for firm i in year t 
∑j INDj
 
= 1 if firm i is from industry j, based on GICS industrial codes and 0 otherwise 
   
2). P-values are given in parentheses below the coefficient, one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.  
3). the estimated coefficients and t statistics are two-way cluster-robust adjusted with White (1980) method.  
Sun & Rath:Pre Managed Earnings Benchmarks 
51 
 
 
Further Tests 
 
We perform a variety of additional tests to assess the robustness of our findings to measurement 
errors associated with discretionary accruals. 
The finding of the disappearance of the discontinuity around zero in the histogram 
analysis could be argued as a statistical artefact because the construction of the pre-managed 
earnings basically removes the variation from the Jones model. To test this, following the 
method of Gore et al (2007) we generate a randomly determined ‘pseudo discretionary accruals’ 
for each firm-year observation. The sample of pseudo discretionary accruals has a normal 
distribution with mean and standard deviation set equal to the sample distribution of Adj(DAit).  
We then construct the pre-managed earnings as reported earnings minus the pseudo discretionary 
accruals (rather than removing the Adj(DAit)) and recreate the histogram. The histogram shows 
that simulated distribution of pre-managed earnings is fairly smooth around zero. Moreover, Z-
statistics in the intervals immediately below and above zero are −0.62 and −1.10 (not reported), 
which are insignificantly different from the expected frequencies. We also construct the pre-
managed earnings change as reported earnings changes minus the ‘pseudo discretionary accruals 
change’. We obtain similar results in that the simulated distribution of pre-managed earnings 
change is smooth. Therefore, without invoking Jones model, the simulation of discretionary 
accruals through pseudo accruals illustrates how accrual manipulation contributes to a 
discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings and earnings changes.  
Second, the construction of pre-managed earnings is to essentially ‘back out’ or deduct 
estimates of discretionary accruals from reported earnings. Error in estimating discretionary 
accruals can lead to possible error in the estimation of pre-managed earnings. This in turn could 
induce spurious association between accounting discretions and pre-managed earnings (Lim & 
Lustgarten 2002).  Following Barua et al. (2006), we use non-discretionary accruals to replace 
discretionary accruals when pre-managed earnings are below or above targets to test for 
accounting discretion.  The intuition behind this procedure is that non-discretionary accruals are 
not supposed to involve earnings management.  However, if results are similar to that of 
discretionary accruals, then the findings are likely to be a consequence of the backing-out error. 
We redefine pre-managed earnings as net income before extraordinary items minus non-
discretionary accruals (PMEit=Eit−NDAit) and repeat all the tests. The regression results show 
that CLUSTER_Nit  are significantly negative in all the four models suggesting that our results 
are not simply a consequence of the backing-out problem.  
         Finally, we use two smaller interval widths of 0.01 and 0.005 to assess whether the 
discontinuity presented in the primary analysis is an artefact of a pre-determined interval. If the 
interval width is too large or small, then the frequencies may not be sensitive to shifts in 
proportions in them. Our tests from the adjustments of intervals are qualitatively similar to 
earlier results in Tables 2 and 3, although with the finer interval we lose the power of our tests. 
We also use operating cash flow as an instrumental variable to surrogate for pre-managed 
earnings as operating cash flow is not related to discretionary accruals (Peasnell et al. 2005). For 
the profit benchmark, the results remain qualitatively unchanged to those reported in the main 
text.   
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Conclusion 
 
This study exploits the distributional properties of ex post earnings and links such properties with 
ex ante pre-managed earnings to identify behaviour that is consistent with earnings management 
practices to beat benchmarks. Using a sample period of 2000 to 2006, we find significant 
discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings. These discontinuities disappear after the 
removal of discretionary components of the earnings in its pre-managed earnings form. This 
evidence is broadly supportive of prior research in Australian context. 
We attempt to find the causality of spikes in reported earnings by examining whether 
managers attempt to influence earnings in trying to meet implicit two earnings benchmarks: 
avoiding losses (zero profit) and positive change in earnings. We find that when pre-managed 
earnings are below zero or prior year’s earnings, firms are more likely to exercise positive 
discretionary accruals to inflate earnings to beat both of these earnings benchmarks. We 
document this through establishing links between frequencies of firms in various subsets of our 
sample to these benchmarks and through our cluster-robust regressions.Our approach and 
measure of pre managed earnings sheds useful insight into the ex ante conditions under which 
firms seek to manipulate earnings. It also has implications for regulators to identify conditions 
under which firms are likely to engage in earnings management practices.  
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